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Abstract—Federated learning enables one to train a common
machine learning model across separate, privately-held datasets
via distributed model training. During federated model training,
only intermediate model parameters are transmitted to a central
server which aggregates these models to create a new common
model, thus exposing only intermediate model parameters rather
than the training data itself. However, some attacks (e.g. member-
ship inference) are able to infer properties of private data from
these intermediate model parameters. Hence, performing the
aggregation of these client-specific model parameters in a secure
way is required. Additionally, the communication cost is often the
bottleneck of the federated systems, especially for large neural
networks. So, limiting the number and the size of communications
is necessary to efficiently train large neural architectures. In this
article, we present an efficient and secure protocol for performing
secure aggregations over compressed model updates in the
context of collaborative, few-party federated learning, a context
common in the medical, healthcare, and biotechnical use-cases
of federated systems. By making compression-based federated
techniques amenable to secure computation, we develop a secure
aggregation protocol between multiple servers with very low
communication and computation costs and without preprocessing
overhead. Our experiments demonstrate the efficiency of this
new approach for secure federated training of deep convoutional
neural networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, the common machine learning (ML) paradigm re-
quires the collection of large volumes of data in order to
train powerful predictive models used across a wide range
of contexts. As more data often begets improved predictive
power, generally one would like to bring together as much
data as possible for a given ML task. However, in many
contexts, this data is of a sensitive and personal nature, and due
to regulations (e.g. GDPR), it may be forbidden to centrally
collect such data ML purposes, irrespective of the societal or
business interest in doing so. Ideally, one would like to be
able to securely train an ML model over sensitive datasets
while ensuring privacy guarantees to the data owners. For
instance, training on medical data across different, geograph-
ically distant, hospitals can be beneficial for the treatment of
rare diseases, but such collaborations are blocked without a
system that properly attends to the interests of data owners,
and the regulators that oversee them. Three core privacy-
preserving ML (PPML) techniques are commonly proposed
in such settings to secure model training and protect training
data, namely, Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) [1],
Homomorphic Encryption (HE) [2], and differential privacy
(DP) [3]. SMC [1] enables multiple clients to jointly evaluate
a function over their input data while keeping this data private
(except what can be inferred from the output). With HE [2],
one is able to perform computations directly on encrypted data.
The goal of DP mechanisms [3], [4] applied to model
training is to reduce the statistical likelihood of any individual
data sample being identified as a training sample, and thus
associated with the trained model, all while attempting to
retain the utility of the model in identifying the data-wide
patterns and correlations desired. When DP mechanisms are
applied to the training of deep learning models via stochastic
gradient descent (SGD), these mechanisms come via an extra
noise term added to each mini-batch gradient [5]. If too much
noise is applied, the privacy guarantees will increase and at
the same time, the overall predictive performance of the model
will decrease, thus putting the goals of privacy and utility at
opposition. However, this trade-off can be controlled through
the parameterization of the DP mechanism selected. We note
that the utility of DP is orthogonal to secured model training,
and it is often of interest to pair DP training with secure
training to ensure the privacy of training data w.r.t. the final
trained model.
When we look to distributed model training over sensi-
tive datasets, we see two main approaches proposed in the
literature: secure function evaluation based on cryptographic
techniques, and distributed privacy-aware distirbuted machine
learning. The first approach attempts to secure the entire
training process and only reveals the final trained model [6],
[7], [8], [9], [10], [11]. This approach is often based on either
SMC protocols (e.g. garbled circuits, secret sharing, etc.) or
HE. However, the currently proposed solutions based on SMC
or HE techniques are often too inefficient for secure deep
neural network training, owing to the high communication
and computational costs associated with the application of
these protocols to modern, massive deep learning models. For
example, HE is currently only applied on computationally
limited tasks, e.g. training linear models, neural network
inference, etc., due to its high computational cost.
The second approach is federated learning (FL), a technique
first introduced [12], [13]. FL is a paradigm to train an ML
model without centralizing data by training at data-bearing
edge devices. The goal of such systems is to learn a model
that benefits from all available datasets while keeping training
data in place. By aggregating model parameters, or the updates
thereof, after short local training steps, FL permits one to
train a global model over previously unobtainable datasets.
While the technique is promising, according to [14], four main
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real-world use cases, namely, i) expensive communication, ii)
system heterogeneity, iii) statistical heterogeneity, and iv) pri-
vacy concerns. In this paper, we will focus on communication
and privacy challenges, simultaneously.
In particular, while leaving data at its source is a significant
step in improvement for the rights of data owners, both in
terms of control and in privacy, sharing intermediate model up-
dates has been demonstrated to leak sensitive information [15],
[16], [17]. To combat this, federated approaches often cou-
ple together DP model training as well as HE- or SMC-
based secure aggregation techniques to ensure that transmitted
model information is privacy preserving. SMC techniques
can be used to securely aggregate the local model updates
without revealing them. This functionality is commonly used
for federated systems [18], and can ensure that individual
contributions remain hidden from federated system operators.
The main bottleneck for the application of SMC techniques is
the additional computation and communication costs.
Using the knowledge of existing PPML techniques, and in
light of their limitations, the challenge for privacy-preserving
distributed ML consists in building a protocol which provides
meaningful privacy guarantees while also being computation
and communication efficient, all without significantly com-
promising accuracy. In this paper, we propose a novel FL
approach which combines neural network update compression
techniques [19], [20], [21] with secure computation. Thanks
to SMC, this approach provides privacy guarantee on model
update exchanges, along with a significant reduction in trans-
mission costs. As evidenced in earlier works, when using com-
pression with the proper error compensation techniques [22],
such improvements in communication efficiency can be gained
without loosing performance.
More precisely, we propose the following novel contribu-
tions:
1) We introduce a new protocol for secure aggregation in
collaborative FL in Sec. IV. This protocol is based on
the adaptation of a federated strategy with model update
compression to secure computation.
2) In our protocol, secure aggregation is performed across
several servers. We prove in Theorem 2 that the privacy
is guarantee when at most all servers except one collude.
3) In Section IV-D, we demonstrate that this protocol has
a very low communication cost
4) Our experiments on MNIST and CIFAR10 presented in
Sec. V prove that our protocol obtains similar accuracy
than non-secure uncompressed FL training with a lower
communication cost. Compared to secure FL training
[18], our protocol has a lower computation and commu-
nication costs.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Federated Learning
1) Collaborative Setting: Many current FL works in the
growing body of literature, such as [23], study massive-scale
use cases where a multitude of different mobiles participate
to the training. In contrast, in this manuscript, we focus on
collaborative FL applied to medical use cases, e.g. clinical
research. In this context, we assume the following settings:
• A small number of participants (generally less than 10)
takes part in the federated training.
• Participants are able to obtain useful trained models from
only their own local dataset, but they would like to
augment their performance through collaboration.
• Unlike the mobile device use-case, all clients are able
to participate in each round with robust connectivity to
the system. This robustness obviates the need for secure
protocols designed specifically to be dropout-resilient,
such as the ones proposed in [18].
2) Federated Optimization: When approaching machine
learning through the lens of empirical risk minimization,
we desire to train a model parameterized by the set of its
coefficients θ, so as to minimize a loss over available training
data samples D,
L(D, θ) = 1|D|
∑
(x,y)∈D
ℓ(x, y, θ), (1)
where ℓ(·, ·) is a sample-specific loss, (x, y) represents the
model inputs and outputs, respectively, and |D| is a count of
the number of data samples.
In FL, we would like to obtain a single trained model from
some datasets held by C clients, Di ∀i ∈ [1, C], without
moving these datasets to a single location for training. When
training a single model over this set of datasets, the federated
loss can be written simply as
F({Di} , θ) =
C∑
i=1
|Di|
N
Li(Di, θ), (2)
where Li is the loss of client i defined as in (1), and
N ,
∑C
i=1 |Di| is the number of data samples in all datasets,
which is used to weigh the per-client losses according to the
relative size of participant datasets1. Critically, (2) can be
evaluated locally at each client i, and then aggregated to obtain
the federated loss.
While (2) can be easily optimized via a batch-distributed
stochastic gradient descent, this is not commonly applied
in practical federated systems, owing to the high degree of
communication required for per-batch synchronization. The
Federated Averaging (FedAvg) introduced by [13] is the most
commonly used strategy in practice, which instead proposes
a synchronized averaging of client models (or their updates)
after a pre-determined number of local update steps. In this
algorithm, within each federated round, denoted by r, each se-
lected participating client i is provided with the current global
model state θ(r), and the following steps are carried out at
each client, where OptE(·) represents an E-step optimization
procedure minimizing (1),
θ
(0)
i ← θ(r), (Local Initial State)
θ
(t+E)
i ← OptE(θ(t)i ,Di) (Local Training)
U
(r)
i ← θ(t+E)i − θ(0)i , (Local Update)
1This approach was proposed in [13], however, such weightings can be
adapted according to the application.
3with thes final updates being transmitted to a central aggrega-
tor who is responsible for maintaining and updating the global
model state,
θ(r+1) ← θ(r) +
C∑
i=1
|Di|
N
U
(r)
i . (Aggregate & Update)
Many federated rounds are computed in sequence until the
global model state converges or meets some desired per-
formance metric. Because multiple local update steps are
used, FedAvg does not optimize (2) for E > 1. Thus,
there is no guarantee that such an algorithm converges, or
provides an acceptable solution, in general [24]. The trade-
off for FedAvg, then, is to select a large enough E so as to
reduce the number of federated rounds required (and therefore
communication and coordination overhead) to reach a desired
performance metric, but not so large that the algorithm fails
to converge.
3) Communication-Efficient FL: While FedAvg addresses
communication-efficiency by reducing the number of required
data exchanges, it does not address the size of the model
update messages communicated within that round. In computer
vision and natural language tasks, neural architectures can
often be quite large, comprising many tens of thousands, or
millions of parameters. In the application of FL to problems
in medical imaging (e.g. volumetric segmentation), such large
model sizes are ubiquitous [25]. During one aggregation
phase, each participant sends its local model update to the
aggregator and the aggregator sends back to each participant
the aggregated model update. Since the size of a local model
update is of the same dimensionality as the original model, the
aggregation phase of federated rounds represents a significant
bandwidth cost, and therefore a limitation in the practicality
of FedAvg for such use cases.
Over the past several years, speeding distributed large model
training has been a topic of focus of works such as [26], [19],
[20], [21]. These approaches show that there exists an inherent
compressibility in model updates which can be exploited to
reduce the communication costs of distributed training while
retaining the predictive accuracy of the final model. In the case
of [26], this was evidenced by the ability to encode gradients
using only the direction (sign) of each coefficient. In [19], this
approach was further enhanced by demonstrating that very few
of these components carry significant information, and many
can be discarded, resulting in a so-called ternary coding of
the model update [27]. Both of these approaches made use
of an error compensation (EC) scheme to stabilize training
with quantized and compressed model updates. EC has been
studied analytically in [22], [28], where it is shown that when it
is used in conjunction with a variety of compression schemes,
the convergence rate of the optimization remains the same
as vanilla, uncompressed stochastic gradient descent. Recent
practical works such as [20], [21] have demonstrated the
utility of such model update compression schemes in practical
federated settings.
4) Privacy Risks of Sharing Local Updates: Even if the
training data are not shared in FL, the training data are not safe
during a FL training due to the sharing of intermediate model
parameters, which may leak sensitive information. There exist
many attacks based on the knowledge of the model parameters
such as membership inference [29], [30] or data reconstruction
attacks [31], [32] and new attacks are regularly created.
Membership inference attack consists to create an oracle that
given a sample, answers whether this sample has been used
during the training. In data reconstruction attacks, the goal
of the attacker is to reconstruct the data used to train the
model. To conclude, it is essential to restrict the amount of
visible intermediate training information, through techniques
such as secure aggregation, to reduce the effectiveness of such
attacks in revealing sensitive or identifying information about
the training data.
B. Secure Multiparty Computation
SMC is a subfield of cryptography which allows several
parties to jointly evaluate a function over their inputs while
keeping these inputs private. Many protocols exist in this field,
such as Yao garbled circuit [33] and secret sharing [34]. These
protocols have different trade-offs between the computation
cost, the communication costs, and the number of required
communication rounds. The computation cost is dominated
by the number of expensive cryptographic operations.
1) Security Definitions: A SMC protocol is determined to
be secure if the two following requirements are met.
• Correctness. The output of the protocol is correct for the
desired secure operation.
• Privacy. Each party will learn their output and nothing
else, except what they can infer from their own input and
their own output.
Different kinds of adversaries are traditionally considered:
• Semi-honest adversaries follow the protocol but try to
infer as much information as possible from the observed
messages,
• Malicious adversaries can use any kind of strategy to
learn information,
• Covert adversaries are malicious but do not wish to be
caught,
• Static adversaries select the parties to corrupt at the
beginning of the protocol execution. The set of corrupted
parties is fixed for the whole protocol execution,
• Adaptive adversariesmay select the corrupted parties dur-
ing the protocol execution. The selection of the corrupted
parties may be based on what the adversary learns during
the protocol execution.
In this paper, we will only take into account static (semi-honest
or malicious) adversaries.
2) Real-world/ideal-world simulation: A real-world/ideal-
world simulation game [35] is traditionally used to prove the
privacy of a SMC protocol. The goal is to prove that whatever
can be computed by an adversary A during the protocol
can also be computed from only the inputs and outputs of
the parties controlled by this adversary noted InputsA and
OutputsA. To do that, we have to define a simulator SA who
only knows InputsA and OutputsA and who generates the
view of all parties controlled by the adversary in the execution.
The protocol is private if for all adversarial behaviors in a real
4execution, there exists a simulator such that the view of the
adversary in the real execution and in the simulated execution
called ideal execution are indistinguishable.
As we later show in Section IV-C, our proposed method
is private against malicious adversaries and correct against
semi-honest adversaries. Thus, a malicious adversary cannot
learn information about the input data of honest parties, but
they can modify messages such that the output is incorrect. A
malicious adversary may also abort during the protocol and
then, the protocol will be stopped and nobody will obtain
the final trained model. In collaborative FL use cases, data
owners benefit from the trained global model and therefore do
not want to reduce their own performance. Therefore, semi-
honest correctness is sufficient for our use case. In addition,
any participants have an incentive to try to obtain information
about data held by other participants. Hence, our protocol must
be private against malicious adversaries.
C. Notation
In this paper, [a, b] represents the set of integers {a, a +
1, ..., b}. Zm (resp. Z∗m) is isomorphic to [0,m − 1] (resp.
[1,m−1]). The space of vectors of length n whose components
belong to Zm is represented by Z
n
m. The notation x ∈R S
indicates that x is sampled uniformly at random from the finite
set S. And when x ∈R Znm, all coordinates of x are sampled
independently and uniformly at random from Zm. The notation
S\i represents the set S deprived of the element i
S\i = {k ∈ S | k 6= i}
We have also some notations related to the federated system:
• N – number of trainable parameters of the neural net-
work, equivalent to the length of the vector of updates
sent by each client to the aggregation server,
• C – number of clients participating in the federated
system,
• R – number of federated rounds, which is equal to the
number of aggregations.
D. Fixed-Point Representation
While ML models are very often parameterized by floating-
point values, SMC protocols do not support floating-point
values for computation. Thus, a fixed-point representation is
required to represent these real values into integers. Further-
more, SMC operations are applied in a finite field (e.g. Zq).
Parameters of the fixed-point representation and the finite field
should be selected with attention in order to avoid overflows
during secure computation.
In this manuscript, we will use the fixed-point representation
presented in [36]. Each real value x ∈ R is converted into
Q(x) ∈ Z2λ such that
Q(x) =
{
2λ − ⌊2a · |x|⌋ if x < 0,
⌊2a · x⌋ if x ≥ 0. (3)
The integer λ corresponds to the number of bits used to
represent x and the integer a corresponds to the number of
bits used to represent only the fractional part of x. With this
approach, larger is the value of a, the more accurate is the
fixed-point representation, but also the more bits are required
to store all possible states.
In practice, all x (inputs, intermediate results and outputs)
belong to a finite interval. The integer a is selected according
to the wanted floating point precision. To avoid overflow
issues, the value of λ is set according to the largest value
resulting from any step in the secure computation.
III. RELATED WORK
A. General methods for Secure Aggregation in FL
To date, proposed secure aggregation schemes in FL have
utilized both SMC and HE approaches. Secure aggregation
methods based on HE [38], [39] require a single round
of communication, but also require expensive cryptographic
operations. On the contrary, secure aggregation method based
on MPC [18], [40] have a lower computational cost, but
a higher communication cost. In secure computation, it is
common to combine both HE and SMC [41] in order to obtain
a desirable trade-off between computation and communication
costs. Unfortunately, with these hybrid secure protocols, one
must convert between HE-encrypted and SMC-encrypted data,
a process which often induces a significant amount of compu-
tational overhead.
B. Practical Secure Aggregation
[18] introduces a secure aggregation protocol based on
Threshold Secret Sharing (TSS). This protocol requires the
use of a single aggregation server, a requirement which we
relax in our proposed method in Section IV. In [18], at
each round, the aggregator server learns the aggregated result
without learning any information on the local model updates,
even if some parties drop out over the course of the secure
aggregation phase. To be resilient against dropouts is necessary
for the use-case of federated learning over mobile devices,
where robust connectivity of the edge devices participating in
a federated round is not guaranteed. Through the use of Shamir
secret sharing, the aggregator will still be able to evaluate the
aggregation as long as sufficient number of parties remain over
the course of the secure aggregation round.
With respect to computational requirements, this technique
protocol relies on key agreements, asymmetric cryptogra-
phy, and the use of cryptographically-secure pseudo-random
number generators (PRG). These cryptographic operations
are computationally expensive and increase the computational
burden for each participating party.
To be resilient against dropouts, the protocol of [18] also
requires additional communication and coordination between
the parties. Specifically, public keys and encrypted shares are
routed from one client to another through the central coor-
dination server, incurring extra communication costs. More
precisely, for one round, the total communication cost is
C · (2C · aK + (5C − 4)aS + 2N⌈log2 T ⌉) bits, (4)
where aK = 256 is the number of bits in a public key,
aS = 256 is the number of bits in an encrypted share and
ZT is the field in which all operations are evaluated (e.g.
5Protocol Total Comm. / Round Required Operations
[18] C · (2C · aK + (5C − 4)aS + 2N⌈log2 T ⌉) Asymmetric encryption, PRG
[37] with TSS 2SCN⌈log
2
(2C + 1)⌉ Polynomial interpolation
[37] with HE 4CN(prec+ pad) Paillier HE
TABLE I: Communication and computation costs of the secure aggregations from [18], [37]
T = 232). See Appendix B for more details about this
communication cost. The main drawbacks of this approach are
its high computation cost and the fact that aggregated updates
are revealed to the aggregator server. In the collaborative
FL setting we investigate, the trade-offs made to tailor this
protocol to the mobile device use-case are not necessary.
C. Secure Submodel Aggregation
In [42], the authors introduce a new FL method to securely
train a deep interest network (DIN) in the context of mobile
clients (low computation, low bandwidth, low space). In their
protocol, each client updates only a small part of the global
model, a submodel, the size of which depends on the number
of the client’s previously bought products. The main steps of
the secure submodal aggregation are given as follows.
1) Each client securely retrieves their submodel (without
revealing his interest classes) from the aggregator server
thanks to a private information retrieval (PIR) protocol.
2) The clients perform a private set union (PSU) to obtain
the union of their interest sets without revealing their
own interest set.
3) The clients and the server perform a secure aggregation
on the submodel defined by the union of the interest
sets.
To accomplish this aggregation practically, the authors focus
on two main concepts. First, to reduce communication cost,
clients only download submodels and never need to download
the full network, which can be massive in large-scale e-
commerce applications. Second, the secure aggregation is split
into two components to scale costs according to the client
interest sets: the PSU step preceding the secure aggregation,
which premits the secure aggregation to be performed for only
a fragment of the original, massive DIN.
With respect to computational costs associated with their
secure protocol, their proposed PSU protocol is implemented
with Bloom filters [43], thus requiring many hash function
evaluations in order to build the different filters. This extra
hashing requirement can also incur significant computation
cost that scales with the size of the clients’ interest sets.
In our demonstrations, we will not compare with this
approach, as its proposed secure aggregation is specific to
the DIN use-case and cannot be applied on generic neural
networks. Unlike the model-tailored approach of [42], our
proposed technique is based on simple concepts which can
be generalized across a wide range of neural network archi-
tectures. While we do propose a two-step approach to efficient
aggregation of compressed model updates, as well, our PSU
step does not utilize costly Bloom filter calculations.
D. TernGrad Compression with Secure Aggregation
To the best of our knowledge, only one proposal com-
bines neural network update compression with secure ag-
gregation [37]. In this work, the authors make use of
TernGrad [27] for model update compression and subse-
quently suggest two methods to perform the secure aggre-
gation: one based on HE and the second based on TSS.
When compressing a vector with TernGrad, a stochastic
quantization of original vector is obtained which consists of
a scalar factor and a ternary vector with values in {−1, 0, 1}.
Due to the construction of the unbiased stochastic quantizer
used in TernGrad, the compression ratio of the model update
is not a controllable parameter, however, the authors of [27]
demonstrate that around 50% of model updates values are
ignored during training.
In the secure aggregation of [37], the authors propose to se-
curely evaluate the sum of the ternary vectors and subsequently
each client updates their local model from this aggregated
ternary vector and according to their own local scaling factor.
With this aggregation, contrary to traditional FL methods, each
client obtains a different intermediate model at the beginning
of each federated round. The authors did not investigate the
possibility for training divergence over the course of federated
training using such an approach. Additionally, since each client
obtains a different model, it is necessary to explain how these
different models should be used; e.g. do they generalize to
other tasks individually? Should they be aggregated through
some other technique? While interesting in the context of
decentralized learning, the prospect of multi-model training
is not well explored in the FL literature. Contrary to this
approach, we focus on the federated training of a single model
across decentralized clients.
With respect to computation cost, the authors propose two
different approaches to perform the secure aggregation, each
of which requires its own flavor of costly cryptographic
procedures. For the version based on TSS, the implementation
requires the evaluation of some polynomial interpolations,
while their version based on Paillier HE requires some expen-
sive homomorphic encryption and decryption operations. For
communication costs, the authors do not take into account the
sparsity of the ternary vector and thus, their communication
cost is not optimal with respect to the significant information
contained in the model update. Moreover, with HE, the cipher-
text is usually much larger than the plaintext data, incurring
an extra communication cost for its use. More precisely, the
total communication cost per round for their TSS-based secure
aggregation is equal to
2SCN⌈log2(2C + 1)⌉ bits, (5)
and the total communication cost per round for their HE secure
6aggregation is equal to
CN(prec+ pad) bits, (6)
where prec = 24 and pad = 8 are HE parameters used to
avoid overflows.
In our proposed method, we adapt a compressed FL learning
strategy to be more amenable to secure computation in order to
obtain a secure aggregation which has a lower communication
and computation costs than reported in [18], [37]. Table I
summarizes the communication and computation costs of the
secure aggregations from [18], [37].
IV. PROPOSED METHOD
In this paper, we focus on collaborative FL, a context often
encountered in medical applications of federated techniques.
Within this context, we assume that our participants are a
“small” (< 20) set of hospitals which possess robust and
consistent network connections, as well as a desire to train
large computer vision models for medical imaging data. The
aim of this work is to present a secure FL technique which
answers to the following four design constraints:
i) Perform the model update aggregation in a secure
way. Nothing will be revealed to the aggregation servers,
only the clients who are engaged in model training will
learn the aggregated updates, and thus whatever informa-
tion can be inferred from these updates in conjunction
with their local data and model updates. Specifically, our
protocol must be:
a) Private in the malicious settings. Clients and
servers may want to obtain information about other
clients training data. They may deviate from the
defined protocol to obtain as much information as
possible. Thus, our protocol must be private against
malicious adversaries.
b) Correct in the semi-honest settings. Participants
would like to improve their local model perfor-
mance through collaboration. Therefore, they have
an incentive to behave correctly in order to obtain
a trained model with better performance than their
local model. Thus, correctness in the semi-honest
model is sufficient.
ii) No compromise on accuracy. Our method must obtain
a similar accuracy than non-secure FedAvg.
iii) Computation Efficient. Our method must not use expen-
sive cryptographic operations.
iv) Communication Efficient. Our method must have a
smaller communication cost than non-secure uncom-
pressed FedAvg.
In this section, we will first describe a communication-
efficient FL algorithm which is amenable to efficient secure
aggregation in Sec. IV-A. Then, we will present an efficient
and secure sum of vectors protocol in Sec. IV-B; this secure
sum algorithm is the main block of our efficient secure
aggregation protocol described in Sec. IV-C. Our method is
summarized in Alg. 1.
A. Communication-Efficient FL
1) Updates Compression with Error Compensation: Our
method is based on the compression of the updates sent from
clients to the aggregation server with an error compensation to
ensure convergence [19], [22], [20]. Over the past few years,
it has been demonstrated that compressing updates with error
compensation permits one to reduce the communication costs
of distributed model training without compromising predictive
performance of the final model. Notably, both the empirical
and theoretical work in this area has shown that even very
biased and severe model update quantization and compression
techniques can be used while still producing a convergent
model training.
Recently, the DoubleSqueeze technique [21] was intro-
duced. In this technique, the model updates sent to the server
are compressed and the aggregated updates returned from the
server to the clients are also compressed. While this additional
compression step would be welcomed, we recall from our
design requirements that we would like to securely evaluate
all computations performed on the server. Unfortunately, the
recompression of the aggregated updates would require either
knowledge of the aggregated update in the clear, or the ability
to securely and efficiently perform a Top-k selection [28], an
operation which cannot be efficiently evaluated in a secure
way. Thus, we decided to only compress updates sent from
the clients to the server and to not compress the aggregated
updates on the server side. See Alg. 1 for further details on
the federated training procedure with compressed updates with
error compensation.
2) TopBinary Coding: For the compression method, we
used a combination of the Top-k sparsification [28] as well as
1-bit quantization [44] which we note here as TopBinary
coding. The Top-k sparsification jointly compresses a vector
X by retaining only the k components with largest magnitude,
and assuming all other components are zero magnitude. More
precisely, let X ∈ RN , then ∀i ∈ [1, N ],
Top-k(X)[πi] =
{
X [πi], if πi ≤ k,
0, otherwise.
(7)
where π is a sorting permutation of [1, N ] such that ∀i ∈
[1, N − 1], |X [πi]| ≥ |X [πi+1]|. In order to speak about the
same relative compression rate between models of varying
architectures, we will introduce the term ρ , k
N
, which is
interpreted as a desired model update sparsity level selected
as a hyper-parameter of model training.
To further reduce communication costs, we also employ
the one-bit quantization to the k significant model update
coefficients [20], [19]. This scalar quantization maps each
non-zero element of a vector x to the binary set {−αlo, αhi}
according to their signs. The selection of these two magnitude
values varies from work to work, with some suggesting the
use of the average magnitude of the negative and positive
coefficients, respectively [45], [20], while others suggest a
constant factor chosen as a training hyper-parameter [19]. As
in [19], [27], we propose a uniform magnitude level, e.g.
7αlo = αhi = α. Together with Top-k sparsification, we obtain
the TopBinary coder,
TopBinary(X ; k) = α · sgn ◦ Top-k(X), (8)
where
α ,
||X ||2
||sgn ◦ Top-k(X)||2 =
1√
k
||X ||2 (9)
is a scaling factor used to preserve the Euclidean norm of
X . We note that the implementation of the proposed secure
protocol does not depend tightly on this construction of α, and
other definitions could be chosen, as well.
The TopBinary coded vector can be split into two
components: the scalar factor α and the vector of signs
D = sgn ◦ Top-k(X). Furthermore, when ρ is small, the
ternary-valued D can instead be represented by two k-length
vectors, namely, the list of non-zero indices, V = [π1, . . . , πk],
and the signs of the coefficients at those non-zero locations,
(D)|V = [D[π1], . . . , D[πk]].
These sequences can be coded into binary representations
easily for transmission. In the case of (D)|V , the sign sequence
can be represented with k bits, however, as we expect the sign
sequence to be essentially random, there is no expected gain
in applying an entropy coding to this sequence. The support
sequence V is compressible, and can be efficiently represented
with adaptive run-length codes, as proposed in [19], [20]. We
can estimate the lower-bound on the required number of bits to
represent V according to its entropy, Hρ = −(1−ρ) log2(1−
ρ)− ρ log2 ρ. Assuming a 32-bit floating-point representation
for α, we can calculate the size if the TopBinary-coded
model updates as
32 +HρN + ρN bits. (10)
3) Separate Aggregation: To reduce complexity in secure
computation (and thus to reduce computational cost), we
suggest an alternative to aggregate compressed model updates
called separate aggregation (SepAgg). This approach sepa-
rately aggregates the scaling factors and the vector of signs of
the TopBinary-coded model updates. Let αi ·Di the updates
of the client i. In SepAgg, the aggregated update is given as
U =
1
C2
(
C∑
i=1
αi
)(
C∑
i=1
Di
)
(11)
whereas usually a direct aggregation (DirectAgg) is
performed and the aggregated updates is defined as
1
C
∑C
i=1 αiDi. We contrast these two approaches in Ap-
pendix A, where we show the derivation of the scaling term
for SepAgg as well as demonstrate the contexts in which it
serves as an appropriate proxy for DirectAgg.
With SepAgg, the convergence of the federated training is
not proved. However in our experiments, federated training
with this SepAgg provides similar trained model predictive
performance than FedAvg training with DirectAgg. The
main advantage of this SepAgg is to be SMC-friendly without
compromising accuracy.
Algorithm 1: SMC-friendly Compressed Update FL
Input: Number of rounds R, number of local updates
E, initial global model state θ(0), local datasets
Di, desired compression factor ρ.
1 Initialization
2 δ
(0)
i ← 0, ∀i ∈ [1, C]
3 θ
(0)
i ← θ(0) ∀i ∈ [1, C]
4 for r = 0, 1, ..., R− 1 do
5 Locally on each client i
/* Local Model Update */
6 Ui ← OptE
(
θ
(r)
i ,Di
)
− θ(r)i
/* Coding of EC Update */
7 (αi, Di)← TopBinary(Ui + δ(r)i )
/* Update Error Accumulator */
8 δ
(r+1)
i ← δ(r)i + (Ui − αi ·Di )
9 Via SMC between clients and servers
10 D ← SecurelySum(D1, . . . , DC)
11 α← SecurelySum(α1, . . . , αC)
12 Locally on each client i
/* Update the local weights */
13 θ
(r+1)
i ← θ(r)i + αC2D
B. Core Secure Sum Protocol
In this section, we propose an MPC protocol to efficiently
sum a set of vectors in Znm and evaluate its costs in terms of
both communication and computation. This protocol will serve
as a core building block for the set of higher-level protocols
we will propose in the next sections for the specific case of
secure aggregation of sparse vectors.
1) Protocol Architecture: For our secure computations, we
will use a classical architecture comprised of parties in two
kinds:
• C data owners (clients) who transmit secret shares of
their data to the servers,
• and S ≥ 2 servers who securely evaluate a function on
these shares and transmit back the shares of the result to
each client.
Finally, the clients combine their received result shares to
obtain the final expected result of the computation. The
proposed protocol does not require that the parties playing the
role of the server are mutually exclusive from the client parties,
and so creates an opportunity for a completely decentralized
construction of the architecture (e.g. S = C). No matter the
architecture, the proposed protocol will only reveal to the
clients the result of the secure function evaluation, with the
caveat that if a client is also a server, then this party will
observe the result by virtue of being a client, themselves. The
privacy of our proposed protocol relies only on the fact that
at most S − 1 malicious servers collude. If it is likely that
a few servers might collude, then the decentralized nature of
this protocol allows one to grow the number of servers so that
the collusion of S servers becomes unlikely.
2) Protocol: Each client possess a vector Xi ∈ Znm, and
desires to know the sum of all client vectors, X =
∑C
i=1Xi
8Algorithm 2: Secure Sum Protocol
Input: Each client has a vector Xi ∈ Znm
1 Locally on each Client i
/* Create & Transmit Shares */
2 Ri,j ← sample(Znm) ∀j ∈ [1, S − 1]
3 Ri,S ← Xi −
∑S−1
j=1 Ri,j mod m
4 Transmit Ri,j to Serverj , ∀j ∈ [1, S]
5 Locally on each Server j
/* Aggregate received shares */
6 Rj ←
∑C
i=1Ri,j mod m
7 Broadcast Rj to all clients
8 Locally on each Client i
/* Aggregate received shares */
9 X ←∑Sj=1 Rj mod m
Output:
{
Clients: X =
∑C
i=1Xi mod m
Servers: ∅
mod m, but each client does not wish to reveal their own
vector to other parties. To accomplish this, we propose a secure
sum of vectors protocol based solely on additive masked
vectors. More precisely, each client sends some additive masks
of his vector to S ≥ 2 servers, then the servers add all received
masked data and send back the result to each client. The clients
obtain the aggregated vectors by adding the received result
shares. See Alg. 2 for a detailed presentation of this protocol.
3) Correctness & Security: We now turn our attention to
both the correctness of the proposed protocol, in the semi-
honest setting, as well as the privacy of the protocol in the
case of malicious parties.
Theorem 1. The Secure Sum Protocol is correct against semi-
honest adversaries.
Proof. The correctness of our secure sum protocol against
semi-honest adversaries is straightforward and follows directly
via substitution from the protocol description in Alg. 2.
Working backwards from the local addition of result shares,
X =
S∑
j=1
Rj mod m, (L.9)
=
S∑
j=1
C∑
i=1
Ri,j mod m, (L.6)
=
C∑
i=1
Ri,S + S−1∑
j=1
Ri,j
 mod m,
=
C∑
i=1
Xi mod m, (L.3)
where the line numbers refer to the lines of Alg. 2.
The correctness in the malicious settings is not required
if the clients and servers have the same incentive to obtain a
trained model with good prediction performance. We make this
assumption due to the collaborative FL context we put in place
in Sec. II, and under this assumption we do not include extra
features into the protocol to protect against poisoning attacks
from malicious parties who intend to break its correctness.
Instead, we focus on what a malicious adversary controlling
multiple parties could learn from the observation of the
protocol.
Theorem 2. The Secure Sum Protocol is private against a
malicious adversary controlling at most S − 1 servers and
any number of clients.
Proof. Given in Appendix C.
Since our secure sum protocol is private against a malicious
adversary controlling at most (S− 1) servers and any number
of clients, the malicious adversary cannot learn more than what
he can infer from the inputs and outputs of the parties they
control. In practice, if the adversary controls all clients, the
adversary already knows everything. If the adversary controls
all clients except one, he can deduce the inputs of this honest
client from the inputs and outputs of the clients that are under
his control. If the adversary controls at most (C−2) clients, the
adversary can infer the sum of the inputs of the honest clients
from the inputs and outputs of the clients that he controls, but
not the individual inputs of the honest parties. In this manner,
the security of the individual clients is preserved, however the
sum of vectors of honest parties is not.
4) Computation & Communication Costs: Owing to the
construction of the secure sum protocol, the computation
incurred by all parties to execute the secure sum protocol is
quite minimal, as it involves only additions modulo m at all
parties. Clients have an additional burden to produce S − 1
random vectors in Znm, but the computational cost of producing
such batches of random values is also minimal. Notably,
the proposed secure sum protocol also does not require any
external coordination steps, as in [18], to coordinate mask
generation, but instead all client parties may act independently
when producing data shares. The simplicity of the proposed
protocol offers an ability to reduce the overall round-time
required for ensuring the secure aggregation of model updates,
thus allowing for more federated rounds to be executed within
a fixed time interval.
The communication cost can be calculated as the number
of bits required to transmit all shares to the servers and
subsequently for all servers to transmit shares back to the
clients. Specifically, each client sends to each server a single
vector in Znm of n · ⌈log2m⌉ bits. Subsequently, each server
sends back to each client one vector in Znm of n · ⌈log2m⌉
bits. Thus, the total communication cost required to execute
this protocol is
2 · S · C · n · ⌈log2m⌉ bits. (12)
C. Compressed Secure Aggregation Protocol
Now that we have a decentralized, secure, and
computationally-efficient secure sum protocol in hand to
use as a building block, we will now demonstrate how
to construct a protocol for the efficient aggregation of
sparse quantized vectors, namely, the ones produced by the
TopBinary coding described in Sec. IV-A. Our proposed
9Algorithm 3: Compressed Secure Aggregation
Input: Each client i has a vector Xi = αiDi ∈ RN
1 Via SMC between Clients and Servers
/* Union of Indices (Algs. 5, 4) */
2 V ← ⋃Ci=1 Vi = ⋃Ci=1{k ∈ [1, N ] | Di[k] 6= 0}
/* Sum of Signs (Alg. 6) */
3 D ←∑Ci=1(Di)|V
/* Sum of Factors (Alg. 7) */
4 α←∑Ci=1Q(αi)
5 Locally at Each Client i
6 U ← α
C2
·D
Output:

Clients: U = SepAgg(X1, . . . , XC)
V,D, α
Servers: ∅
secure aggregation protocol for compressed model updates
can be described in three steps:
1) a union of the list of indices of each client,
2) a sum of the signs restricted on the union of the list of
indices,
3) and finally, a sum of the scalar factors.
These steps are described in more detail in Alg. 3.
In the next sections we will detail why the intermediate steps
of this protocol are secure (Sec. IV-C1), then we will provide
a number of different approaches for the efficient computation
of the secure union (Sec. IV-C2), the protocol for a secure sum
of sign vectors (Sec. IV-C3), and finally the protocol for the
secure sum of scalar factors (Sec. IV-C4).
1) Security of Intermediate Outputs: At the end of the
secure aggregation round, each client obtains the separate
aggregated updates U (see Eq. 11). From U , the client can
easily infer the following pieces of information:
• the union of the list of indices via
V˜ = {k ∈ [1, N ] | U [k] 6= 0},
where V˜ ⊂ V = ⋃Ci=1{k ∈ [1, N ] | Di[k] 6= 0} and
V \V˜ = {k ∈ V | ∑Ci=1Di[k] = 0}
• the sum of the scalar factors via
α˜ = C2 ·min
k∈V
|U [k]| ,
where α˜ = α if at least one index of the sum of the signs
is equal to −1 or 1, which is the case when one index
has been selected by exactly one client, an occurrence we
expect to be highly likely,
• and the sum of the signs via
D =
(
C2
α
)
U.
Notably, each of these pieces of information is an intermediate
output of the generic compressed secure aggregation protocol
we propose (Alg. 3). Thus, revealing to the clients these
intermediate outputs over the course of the protocol does not
provide any additional information than what they could learn
simply from their knowledge of their own inputs and result
Algorithm 4: PartialSecureUnion
Input: Each client i has a list of indices Vi ⊂ [1, N ]
1 Locally on each Client i
/* Create vector Bi representing Vi */
2 ∀k ∈ [1, N ], Bi[k] =
{
1, if k ∈ Vi
0, otherwise
3 Via Secure Sum between clients and servers
/* See Algo. 2 */
4 B =
∑C
i=1 Bi mod (C + 1)
5 Locally on each Client i
/* Compute the union of indices */
6 V = {k ∈ [1, N ]|B[k] 6= 0}
Output:
{
Clients: V =
⋃C
i=1 Vi
Servers: ∅
of the secure protocol at its completion. Hence, the proposed
stepwise approach is secure as long as its individual steps is
secure, which we will show in the following sections.
2) Secure Union Protocols: Now, we will define a set of
protocols, each with a different secure perimeter and com-
munication cost trade-off, for finding the union of non-zero
indices of TopBinary-coded vectors between clients. We
compare these different approaches in Table II. In each pro-
tocol, each client i has a list of indices Vi whose components
belong to [1, N ]. The clients would like to securely evaluate
the union of the lists of indices V =
⋃C
i=1 Vi.
a) PartialSecureUnion: In this protocol, each
client will create a Boolean vector Bi representing their list
of indices Vi such that, ∀k ∈ [1, N ],
Bi[k] =
{
1, if k ∈ Vi,
0, otherwise .
(13)
Using this representation, the clients can securely calculate the
union of indices through the use of Alg. 2 by evaluating the
sum of their Boolean vectors Bi in Z
N
C+1. At the end of the
secure sum evaluation, each client will obtain B =
∑C
i=1Bi
mod (C + 1), from which they may easily infer the union of
indices V by selecting the positions of non-zero values in B.
In this protocol, client learns the union of indices and also the
number of clients having each index. See Alg. 4 for a detailed
presentation of this PartialSecureUnion algorithm.
In terms of privacy and security, the simplicity of the
PartialSecureUnion is gained by permitting the knowl-
edge of B at each client. Here, B reveals to the clients how
many clients have non-zero values at a given index, however
it does not reveal which clients. Though correlated, such
information is somewhat stronger than what is available via U ,
which can only be used to measure the relative frequency of a
certain location being positive or negative in the sign vector.
b) SecureUnion: In this protocol, each client will
create a vector Ai representing its list of indices Vi such that
∀k ∈ [1, N ],
Ai[k] =
{
Ri,k, if k ∈ Vi where Ri,k ∈R Z∗2q ,
0, otherwise .
(14)
10
Protocol Communication Cost (bits) Clients Learn (besides V ) Servers Learn
PlaintextUnion 2 · C ·N Nothing Clients’ list of indices
PartialSecureUnion 2 · S · C ·N · ⌈log
2
(C + 1)⌉ How many clients have selected each index Nothing
SecureUnion 2 · S · C ·N · q If they alone selected each index Nothing
TABLE II: Comparison of secure union protocols
Algorithm 5: SecureUnion
Input: Each client i has a list of indices Vi ⊂ [1, N ]
1 Locally on each Client i
/* Create vector Ai representing Vi */
2 Ai[k] =
{
Ri,k, if k ∈ Vi where Ri,k ∈R Z∗2q ,
0, otherwise .
3 Via Secure Sum between clients and servers
/* See Algo. 2 */
4 A =
∑C
i=1Ai mod 2
q
5 Locally on each Client i
/* Compute the union of indices */
6 V = {k ∈ [1, N ]|A[k] 6= 0}
Output:
{
Clients: V ≈ ⋃Ci=1 Vi
Servers: ∅
Subsequently, the clients will securely evaluate the sum of
the vectors Ai in Z
N
2q using Alg. 2. At the end of the secure
sum evaluation, each client will obtain A =
∑C
i=1 Ai mod 2
q
from which each client can easily infer the union of indices
by selecting the positions of non-zero values in A. A detailed
description of the SecureUnion protocol is given in Alg. 5.
When using the SecureUnion protocol, the resulting
union of indices may have some false negatives, as there
is potential for the masked entries of A to cancel out, thus
impacting the correctness of this protocol. Specifically, when
more than two clients have the same index, the sum of
random values Ri,k will be equal to 0 with probably 1/2
q,
causing k to be omitted from V when it should be present.
Increasing q can make the probability of such false negatives
increasingly rare, but at the cost of increased working space,
and therefore, increased communication cost. This potential
error is in contrast with PartialSecureUnion, which
will always be correct. We note that, in experimentation, the
proposed communication-efficient FL in Alg. 1 is observed
empirically to be quite robust to such dropped support.
In terms of information leakage, if one client observes that
the component A[k] in the sum result is equal to their random
component Ri,k, then the client can infer that with very high
probability he is alone to have this index k.
c) PlaintextUnion: In this protocol, the clients will
only learn the union of indices, however the first server
will learn the list of indices of each client. In this protocol,
each client sends to the first server the Boolean vector Bi
representing their list of indices. The first server evaluates the
union of indices by OR-ing the received Boolean vectors and
transmitting back the resulting Boolean vector to each client.
While such a protocol is not advisable for every setting,
especially for NLP tasks or recommender systems, where the
knowledge of support locations can be indicative of training
features, the effectiveness of many white-box privacy attacks
on distributed ML systems has only been demonstrated for
exact, real-valued model updates, and not for model update
support. In the case of large computer-vision models, such a
security perimeter may be acceptable to the system designer.
d) NoUnion: If the compression rate is very low, the
split of the sum of signs into a union of indices and a sum
on restricted signs vectors is not beneficial. Then, it is more
efficient to perform the secure aggregation in two steps:
• the secure sum of signs vectors Di directly, as V =
[1, N ],
• and the secure sum of scalar factors.
3) Secure Sum of Signs: In the second step of the com-
pressed secure aggregation protocol (see Alg. 3), each client
restricts their dense vector of ternary values Di to the support
resulting from the secure union of indices V , and then together
they securely evaluate the sum of these binary vectors of signs,
(Di)|V . More precisely, the parties would like to securely
evaluate the sum of C vectors of length equal to the size of the
union of indices |V |, each component belongs to {−1, 0, 1}.
The resulting vector will be a vector of size |V | whose
components belong to [−C,C].
To define a protocol for the secure sum of signs, first, each
client will convert each component of its restricted vector from
[−C,C] to [0, 2C] via
Convert(x) =
{
x, if x ∈ [0, C],
x+ (2C + 1), if x ∈ [−C,−1]. (15)
Subsequently, the clients will securely evaluate the sum of
these converted vectors in Z2C+1 using the secure sum proto-
col of Alg. 2. Finally, after obtaining the result of this secure
sum, each client will convert the components of the result
vector from [0, 2C] back to [−C,C] via
Convert−1(x) =
{
x, if x ∈ [0, C],
x− (2C + 1), if x ∈ [C + 1, 2C].
(16)
This protocol is detailed in Alg. 6.
4) Secure Sum of Factors: In the third step of the com-
pressed secure aggregation protocol, each client i has a scalar
factor αi ∈ R and would like to obtain the sum of all
factors α =
∑C
i=1 αi. In SMC, since we may only work with
integers, it is necessary to convert these factors into a fixed-
point representation, which in turn can be easily represented
with integer coding. When choosing parameters a and λ
of the fixed-point representation (see (3)), we must account
for potential overflows when summing together the C scalar
factors. In practice, λ is fixed to 32 bits in order to have a
reasonable precision without unnecessarily increasing the size
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Algorithm 6: Secure Sum of Signs
Input: Each client i has a vector of signs
Di ∈ {−1, 0, 1}N and a common list of indices
V ⊂ [1, N ]
1 Locally on each Client i
/* Convert (Di)|V into [0, 2C] */
2 ∀k ∈ V, (D˜i)|V [k] = Convert((Di)|V [k])
3 Via Secure Sum between clients and servers
/* See Algo. 2 */
4 D˜|V =
∑C
i=1(D˜i)|V mod (2C + 1)
5 Locally on each Client i
/* Convert D˜|V into [−C,C] */
6 ∀k ∈ V,D|V [k] = Convert−1(D˜|V [k])
/* Create the full signs vector */
7 ∀j ∈ [1, N ], D[j] =
{
D|V [j], if j ∈ V
0, otherwise
Output:
{
Clients: D =
∑C
i=1Di
Servers: ∅
Algorithm 7: Secure Sum of Factors
Input: Each client i has a factor αi ∈ R
1 Locally on each Client i
/* Convert αi into the fixed point
representation */
2 α˜i = Q(αi)
3 Via Secure Sum between clients and servers
4 α˜ =
∑C
i=1 α˜i mod 2
λ
5 Locally on each Client i
/* Convert α˜ into R */
6 α = Q−1(α˜)
Output:
{
Clients: α ≈∑Ci=1 αi
Servers: ∅
of the working field. Subsequently, a is chosen so as to avoid
this potential overflow.
After this representation conversion, the clients will securely
evaluate the sum of these converted factors in Z2λ , again using
the secure sum protocol of Alg. 2. Finally, each client will
convert the resulting factor back into the initial space R.
D. Communication Costs
In this section, we estimate the total communication cost per
federated round of FedAvg without secure aggregation and
our proposed method with secure aggregation. The Table III
summarizes these communication costs.
For our calculations and experimental implementation, we
chose a 32-bit floating-point representation for all “unquan-
tized” real values.
1) Federated Averaging without secure aggregation: Each
client sends his updates to one server (32 · N bits) and then
the server sends the aggregated updates to each client (32 ·N
bits). Thus, the total communication cost for one aggregation
with FedAVg is equal to 2 · C · 32 ·N bits.
2) Our method with secure aggregation: We can easily
evaluate the total communication cost in bits of each sub-
protocol of our secure aggregation (Algorithms 4, 5, 6, 7)
from (12):
2 · S · C ·N · ⌈log2(C + 1)⌉ (PartialSecureUnion)
2 · S · C ·N · q (SecureUnion)
2 · C ·N (PlaintextUnion)
2 · S · C · |V | · ⌈log2(2C + 1)⌉ (Sum of Signs)
2 · S · C · λ (Sum of Factors)
where |V | is the size of the union of indices V and λ is a
parameter of the fixed point representation.
V. EXPERIMENTS
For our experimental evaluation, we chose C = 5 and S =
2 to demonstrate a moderately sized collaborative federated
system.
A. Datasets and Model Architectures
To demonstrate the utility of our proposed approaches,
we conduct a series of image classification experiments on
MNIST [46] and CIFAR-10 [47]. For client data, we use
i.i.d. dataset partitions to mimic clients holding data samples
from the same data distribution2. Both of these datasets
represent basic image recognition tasks, namely, handwritten
digit and natural image classification, respectively. For MNIST
experiments, the 70,000 image dataset is randomly shuffled
and then partitioned into a training dataset of 50,000 samples,
a test dataset of 10,000 samples, and a validation dataset of
10,000 samples. Then, the training dataset is partitioned into
five sets, and each is given to one of the C = 5 clients, thus we
have 10,000 samples per client. We conduct the same dataset
partition procedure for CIFAR-10, however as the training
dataset contains 40,000 samples, each client is given only
8,000 samples.
For our MNIST experiments, we train a simple LeNet-
5 network of [48] for the task of digit classification. The
LeNet-5 convolutional neural network (CNN) consists of
N = 61, 706 trainable parameters. For CIFAR-10, we train
the same AlexNet [49] architecture as demonstrated in the
original FedAvg work [50]. We also utilize the same image
preprocessing pipeline as was proposed in this work, e.g. ran-
dom flipping, and normalization. This AlexNet CNN consists
of N = 1, 756, 426 trainable parameters.
The goal of our experiments is to demonstrate that with
our proposed method, compared to FedAvg [13] with no
compression, we obtain a computation and communication
efficient secure aggregation without compromising accuracy.
We note that more modern neural architectures could be
utilized, as well as larger datasets across more varied tasks.
However, as our approach is agnostic to the underlying task,
we utilize these simpler ML experiments for the sake of clarity
of our demonstration.
2While such homogeneity cannot be expected in practice, we control for
inter-client heterogeneity as this aspect is out of the scope of the current work.
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Protocol Sec. Agg. Communication Cost per Federated Round (bits)
FedAvg ✗ 2 · C · 32 ·N
Our method w/ NoUnion ✓
(
2 · S · C ·N · ⌈log
2
(2C + 1)⌉
)
+
(
2 · S · C · 32
)
Our method w/ SecureUnion ✓
(
2 · S · C ·N · q
)
+
(
2 · S · C · |V | · ⌈log
2
(2C + 1)⌉
)
+
(
2 · S · C · 32
)
Our method w/ PartialSecureUnion ✓
(
2 · S · C ·N · ⌈log
2
(C + 1)⌉
)
+
(
2 · S · C · |V | · ⌈log
2
(2C + 1)⌉
)
+
(
2 · S · C · 32
)
Our method w/ PlaintextUnion ✓
(
2 · C ·N
)
+
(
2 · S · C · |V | · ⌈log
2
(2C + 1)⌉
)
+
(
2 · S · C · 32
)
TABLE III: Communication costs per federated round for the different protocols
B. Hyperparameter Selection
Before conducting federated training on our partitioned
MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets, we must first select the
local model training parameters to use at each client. To find
appropriate settings for these hyperparameters, we performed
a grid search on the entire training dataset without FL (i.e.
a single client), evaluating performance on the held-out val-
idation dataset. While this approach cannot be utilized in a
practical FL use-case, it represents a best-case hyperparameter
selection technique, and we fix the hyper-parameter setting
across all approaches. We consider optimal hyperparameter
tuning across federated data out of the scope of this work.
Table IV presents the selected model training hyperparameters
used for experimentation.
Dataset Network LR Batch Momentum Acc. (%)
MNIST LeNet-5 0.01 64 0.9 99.2
CIFAR10 AlexNet 0.10 64 0.0 80.6
TABLE IV: Selected hyperparameters obtained with grid
search for classical single-dataset training .
C. Targeted accuracy
One of main constraints is to not compromise the pre-
diction performance obtained using our proposed techniques
in comparison to non-secure non-compressed FedAvg. Ta-
ble V presents the accuracy obtained with non-secure non-
compressed FedAvg training on five clients with the selected
hyperparameters from Table IV. Here, E represents the num-
ber of local updates performed within each federated round,
i.e. between two successive aggregations. From this table, we
selected a desired performance level to achieve: 98% accuracy
for MNIST and 80% accuracy for CIFAR-10.
D. Results
We conduct several ML training experiments to define
the number of federated rounds R required to obtain the
targeted accuracy defined above (98% for MNIST and 80%
for CIFAR-10) for two strategies, the FedAvg without model
update compression, and the approach of using FedAvg in
conjunction with TopBinary coding of the model updates
for ρ ∈ {0.1, 0.02}. We subsequently analytically estimate
the communication costs associated with using these two FL
approaches in conjunction with different secure aggregation
protocols (see Tables I and III), the results of which are
detailed in Table VI.
Dataset Network E Epochs Acc. (%)
MNIST LeNet-5 10 50 98.9
MNIST LeNet-5 100 50 99.0
CIFAR-10 AlexNet 10 150 81.2
CIFAR-10 AlexNet 100 150 81.3
TABLE V: Accuracy reached on MNIST and CIFAR-10 with
FedAvg over five clients with the selected hyperparameters.
For experiments on FedAvg with TopBinary model
update coding, we also report the mean size of the aggregated
union of indices over the course of federated training, E |V |.
This value gives us an idea of the scale of the union of indices
operation for the different ML training experiments.
In table VI, we also present an evaluation of communication
cost for methods presented in [18], [37]. We see that the
methods propsed in [37] have a total communication cost
close to some of our proposed techniques. The lower costs
associated with these techniques is natural since they make
use of TernGrad as a model-update compression technique.
Since the compression approaches are so similar, we assume
that these techniques with TernGrad compression require a
similar number of federated rounds to obtain the same level
of accuracy as our proposed techniques. Hence, to evaluate
the total communication cost of these methods, we use the
same number of rounds than our approach. We recall that these
approaches cannot be used in practice because at the end of
the FL training, each client obtains a different trained models
and we do not know how to aggregate these models into one
model without compromising accuracy.
These results showcase the low total communication cost of
our proposed compressed secure aggregation approach com-
pared to other techniques with or without secure aggregation.
This communication cost can be further reduced with more
fine tuning, as higher compression rates (i.e. ρ < 0.02) may
be achievable for the same performance level [20]. The higher
the compression rate, the lower the communication cost of our
method compared to other secure aggregation techniques.
From our experiments, we observed that when the number
of local updates is too high (e.g. 100) and the compression rate
is too low (e.g. ρ ≤ 0.01), federated training does not converge
in a reasonable number of federated rounds, and it is not
possible to reach the target model performance. Such findings
confirm the communication analysis presented in [20]: there
exists a lower bound on communication which is reflected by
a trade-off between the number of rounds of communication
(which depends of the number of local updates between two
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Strategy Sec. Agg. E R ρ E |V | Comm. (MB) Expensive Operations
FedAvg ✗ 10 129 - - 303.65 Additions
[18] ✓ 10 129 - - 304.16 Asymmetric encryption, PRG
[37] with TSS ✓ 10 478 - - 281.29 Polynomial interpolation
[37] with HE ✓ 10 478 - - 2250.33 Paillier HE
Our method w/ NoUnion ✓ 10 478 0.02 - 281.33 Additions
Our method w/ SecureUnion ✓ 10 478 0.02 4865 725.44 Additions
Our method w/ PartialSecureUnion ✓ 10 478 0.02 4865 233.18 Additions
Our method w/ PlaintextUnion ✓ 10 478 0.02 4865 57.38 Additions
FedAvg ✗ 100 15 - - 35.31 Additions
[18] ✓ 100 15 - - 35.37 Asymmetric encryption, PRG
[37] with TSS ✓ 100 17 - - 10.00 Polynomial interpolation
[37] with HE ✓ 100 17 - - 80.03 Paillier HE
Our method w/ NoUnion ✓ 100 17 0.10 - 10.01 Additions
Our method w/ SecureUnion ✓ 100 17 0.10 18 253 27.97 Additions
Our method w/ PartialSecureUnion ✓ 100 17 0.10 18 253 10.46 Additions
Our method w/ PlaintextUnion ✓ 100 17 0.10 18 253 4.21 Additions
(a) LeNet on MNIST (98% Acc. Target)
Strategy Sec. Agg. E R ρ E |V | Comm. (GB) Expensive Operations
FedAvg ✗ 100 101 - - 6.61 Additions
[18] ✓ 100 101 - - 6.61 Asymmetric encryption, PRG
[37] with TSS ✓ 100 110 - - 1.80 Polynomial interpolation
[37] with HE ✓ 100 110 - - 14.40 Paillier HE
Our method w/ NoUnion ✓ 100 110 0.10 - 1.80 Additions
Our method w/ SecureUnion ✓ 100 110 0.10 647 249 5.16 Additions
Our method w/ PartialSecureUnion ✓ 100 110 0.10 647 249 2.02 Additions
Our method w/ PlaintextUnion ✓ 100 110 0.10 647 249 0.89 Additions
(b) AlexNet on CIFAR-10 (80% Acc. Target)
TABLE VI: Number of rounds and total communication cost required to reach the targeted accuracy with FedAvg strategy
and our approach on five clients.
consecutive aggregations) and the communication cost at each
round (which depends of the compression rate).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article, we design a secure and efficient protocol
for federated learning. This protocol is based on quantization
to highly reduce the communication cost of the aggregation
without compromising accuracy. We adapt quantizated fed-
erated learning techniques to secure computation in order to
be able to efficiently and securely evaluate the aggregation
steps during a federated training. Thanks to these adaptations,
our secure aggregation protocol relies only on additions (no
expensive cryptographic operations are used) and thus has a
very low computation cost. Given that our secure aggregations
is only based on additions, it can be easily implemented by
non-cryptographic experts. We also prove that our protocol
is private against malicious adversaries and correct against
semi-honest adversaries. Finally, our experiments show the
efficiency of our protocol in real use cases. Compared to prior
works, our protocol has a lower computation cost (because no
expensive operations are used) and has a lower communication
cost thanks to model update compression and lightweight SMC
protocols.
Future works could study in detail the different compres-
sion approaches to further reduce the communication cost.
Moreover, our work does not investigate information leakage
from aggregated compressed updates, which remains for future
works. Finally, we note that there still exist large communica-
tion differences between the different security profiles of the
secure union techniques we propose. It would be of interest for
future works to find better trade-offs in the security perimeter
of such protocols against communication requirements.
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APPENDIX A
FURTHER DETAILS ON TOPBINARY AGGREGATION
Let us first recall the setup for the aggregation. Let us pro-
ceed by assuming that we want to operate on the aggregation
of some real-valued vectors Xi ∈ RN , of which we have C
15
different realizations. From each of these vectors, we calculate
one new vector and one scalar value,
Di = sgn ◦ Top-k(Xi), (17)
αi =
||Xi||2
||Di||2 , (18)
such that ||αiDi||2 = ||Xi||2. Because of the sgn ◦ Top-k
operation, the result sign vector belongs to the space Di ∈
{−1, 0, 1}N , as each entry can only take one of these three
values. Now, since the value of k is fixed for the entire
federated optimization across all workers, we know, trivially,
the number of non-zero entries: k. And, since the non-zero
entries are ±1, we know ||Di||2 =
√
k ∀i, thus
αi =
1√
k
||Xi||2. (19)
Let us now define the different variants of the aggregation
again,
D¯ =
1
C
C∑
i=1
αiDi
=
1
C
√
k
C∑
i=1
LiDi, (DirectAgg)
D˜ =
1
C2
C∑
i=1
αi
C∑
i=1
Di
=
1
C
√
k
· 1
C
C∑
i=1
Li ·
C∑
i=1
Di, (SepAgg)
where Li , ||Xi||2 is the Euclidean norm of the original
vector Xi. Our desire is to compute the value of D¯, however,
for the efficiency of SMC, we may only make use of the
estimate D˜. Given this, how far off will we be, and what
are the effects of using such an estimate?
Let L˜ , 1
C
∑C
i=1 Li, i.e. the average norm of all of the
original vectors Xi, then
D˜ =
L˜√
k
· 1
C
C∑
i=1
Di, (20)
=
1
C
√
k
C∑
i=1
L˜Di, (21)
where we can see that the average norm L˜ serves as an
approximation for the individual norms Li. When using this
norm, we can see the MSE difference between the SepAgg
and DirectAgg as
||D¯ − D˜||22 =
1
C2k
N∑
j=1
(
C∑
i=1
(Li − L˜)Di[j]
)2
, (22)
which shows us that if the expectation of the difference Li−L˜
is small, we can expect that the SepAgg will be an adequate
estimation of the direct aggregation.
APPENDIX B
PRACTICAL SECURE AGGREGATION [18]
COMMUNICATION COST
The communication cost of the Practical Secure Aggrega-
tion protocol is presented in Section 7.1 in [18]. For each
federated round, each client sends to the Server
2n · aK + (5n− 4) · aS +m⌈log2R⌉ bits
where n is the number of clients, m is the number of trainable
parameters, aK = 256 is the number of bits in a public key,
aS = 256 is the number of bits in an encrypted share and ZR
is the field in which all operations are evaluated. And at the
end of the federated round, the server sends the aggregated
model parameters to each client:
m⌈log2R⌉ bits
Thus, the total communication cost for one federated round is
equal to
n · (2n · aK + (5n− 4) · aS + 2m⌈log2R⌉) bits
With our notations, the total communication cost for one
federated round is equal to
C · (2C · aK + (5C − 4) · aS + 2N⌈log2R⌉) bits
where C is the number of clients, N is the number of trainable
parameters and ZR is the field in which all operations are
evaluated.
APPENDIX C
PRIVACY PROOF OF SECURE SUM ALGORITHM
The privacy proof of the Secure Sum Algorithm (see Algo-
rithm 2) is mainly based on the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let b ∈ Zm. If r is a uniform random element in
Zm, then b+ r is also a uniform random element in Zm (even
if b is not a uniform random element in Zm).
We will now prove Theorem 2.
Proof. Let A be an adversary controlling p < S servers,
Serverj1 , . . . , Serverjp , and q ≤ C clients, Clienti1 , . . . ,
Clientiq . In this proof, we will use the following notations
for different sets of servers and clients,
J = {j1, ..., jp}
J = {j | j ∈ [1, S] and j /∈ J}
I = {i1, ..., iq}
I = {i | i ∈ [1, C] and i /∈ I}
We will prove the privacy of our protocol in the ideal-
real paradigm. We will first describe the simulator SA, who
simulates the view of the adversaryA in the ideal world. Then,
we will prove that the views of the adversary A in the ideal
world and in the real world are indistinguishable. We will split
the proof in three cases, depending on the number of clients
the adversary controls,
I. no clients (q = 0),
II. at least one and up to C − 2 clients (1 ≤ q ≤ C − 2),
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III. all clients, or all clients except one (C − 1 ≤ q ≤ C).
CASE I: q = 0
Simulation
SA picks p × C uniformly random vectors R˜i,j , ∀(i, j) ∈
[1, C]× J into Znm and sends them to the adversary A.
Indistinguishability of Views
We will now prove that the views of A in the real world
and in the ideal world are indistinguishable. In the real world,
the adversary A receives from honest parties the following
messages
∀(i, j) ∈ [1, C]× J,Ri,j
If S /∈ J , then by construction, ∀(i, j) ∈ [1, C] × J,Ri,j
are independently and uniformly random in Znm (see L.2 in
Alg. 2). Thus, the views of the adversary A in the real world
and in the ideal world are indistinguishable.
If S ∈ J , since J ( [1, S], then [1, S−1]⋂J is not empty.
Let j∗ be one element of [1, S − 1]⋂ J , and with it rewrite
Ri,S as
Ri,S =
Xi − ∑
j∈[1,S−1]\j∗
Ri,j
−Ri,j∗ mod m. (23)
By construction, ∀i ∈ [1, C], the values Ri,j∗ are uniformly
random in Znm (see L.2 in Alg. 2). By applying Lemma 3,
∀i ∈ [1, C], the values Ri,S are uniformly random in Znm.
This proves that all messages received by A are indepen-
dently and uniformly random in Znm, and thus, the views of
the adversary A in the real world and in the ideal world are
indistinguishable.
CASE II: 1 ≤ q ≤ C − 2
Simulation
SA picks (C − q)× p+ (S − p) uniformly random vectors
into Znm noted R˜i,j , ∀(i, j) ∈ I×J and R˜j , ∀j ∈ J and sends
them to the adversary A.
Indistinguishability of Views
In the real world, the adversary A receives from honest
parties the following messages:{
Ri,j , ∀(i, j) ∈ I × J
Rj , ∀j ∈ J
With a similar proof to CASE I, we can demonstrate that
∀(i, j) ∈ I × J , the values Ri,j are independently and
uniformly random in Znm. Now, let i
∗ be an element in I ,
where I is not empty because the adversary controlled at most
(C − 2) clients. Then, ∀j ∈ J , we can rewrite Rj as
Rj =
 ∑
i∈[1,C]\i∗
Ri,j
+Ri∗,j mod m. (24)
By construction, for all j ∈ J , Ri∗,j are independently and
uniformly random in Znm (see L.2 in Alg. 2). By applying
Lemma 3, ∀j ∈ J , the values Rj are uniformly random in
Znm.
This proves that all messages received by A are indepen-
dently and uniformly random in Znm, and thus, the views of
the adversary A in the real world and in the ideal world are
indistinguishable.
CASE III: C − 1 ≤ q ≤ C
Assume that the adversary controls all the clients (q = C).
Then, the adversary knows all inputs and outputs. Thus, our
protocol is private according to the privacy definition outlined
in Sec. II-B.
Now assume that the adversary controls all clients except
the client i∗. Then, the inputs of the parties controlled by the
adversary are {Xi}i∈[1,C]\i∗ and the outputs of the parties
controlled by the adversary are X =
∑
i∈[1,C]Xi. The
adversary can easily infer the input of the client i∗ as
Xi∗ = X −
∑
i∈[1,C]\i∗
Xi mod m.
Thus, the adversary cannot learn anything more, because
they already know everything. Thus, our protocol is private
according to the privacy definition in Sec. II-B.
